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ABSTRACT
Article 29 Working Party guidelines and the case law of the CJEU facilitate a
plausible argument that in the near future everything will be or will contain
personal data, leading to the application of data protection to everything:
technology is rapidly moving towards perfect identifiability of information;
datafication and advances in data analytics make everything (contain)
information; and in increasingly ‘smart’ environments any information is likely
to relate to a person in purpose or effect. At present, the broad notion of
personal data is not problematic and even welcome. This will change in
future. When the hyperconnected onlife world of data-driven agency arrives,
the intensive compliance regime of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) will become ‘the law of everything’, well-meant but impossible to
maintain. By then we should abandon the distinction between personal and
non-personal data, embrace the principle that all data processing should
trigger protection, and understand how this protection can be scalable.
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1. Introduction
InTheMorality of Law, Lon Fuller tells a tale of a young ruler who undertakes to
reform the law of the land. After a few attempts at it, all met by public discontent,
the ruler wants to teach his subjects a lesson and makes it a crime ‘to cough,
sneeze, hiccough, faint or fall down in the presence of the king… [and] not to
understand, believe in, and correctly profess the doctrine of evolutionary, demo-
cratic redemption’.1 Unsurprisingly, the citizens threaten to disregard the new
law, since ‘[t]o command what cannot be done is not to make law; it is to
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unmake law, for a command that cannot be obeyed serves no end but confusion,
fear and chaos’.2 This can as well become the future of European data protection.
This paper will argue that the material scope of EU data protection law, specifi-
cally, the General Data Protection Regulation3 (‘GDPR’), is growing so broad that
the good intentions to provide the most complete protection possible are likely to
backfire in a very near future, resulting in system overload. The concept ‘personal
data’ determining the material scope of data protection is meant to be broad but is
bound to expand even further and as a result to apply to an exponentially growing
range of situations. This is due to the in-built possibilities for the evolving
interpretation of the concept itself, exploding generation and aggregation of
data, as well as advances in data analytics. As our environment is rapidly
approaching what some call ‘onlife’4 where our daily existence is mediated by
information technology, everything in this environment – weather, waste water,
exam scripts – is being increasingly ‘datified’, and literally any data can be plausibly
argued to be personal. Four major transformations are at the core of this shift:
a. the blurring of the distinction between reality and virtuality;
b. the blurring of the distinction between human, machine and nature;
c. the reversal from information scarcity to information abundance; and
d. the shift from the primacy of stand-alone things, properties and binary
relations, to the primacy of interactions, processes and networks.5
As a result, European data protection law is facing a risk of becoming ‘the law
of everything’, meant to deliver the highest legal protection under all circum-
stances, but in practice impossible to comply with and hence ignored or dis-
credited as conducive to abuse of rights and unreasonable.
Discussion of the expanding scope of personal data has been brewing for
quite some time in the data protection community. Many privacy and data
protection scholars have been critical of the concept of personal data as
growing too broad. The mainstream literature is centred on one element
of the concept of personal data, ie identifiability of a person, and the cor-
responding strand of technological development, ie re-identification and
de-anonymisation algorithms. To name just a few key authors arguing
to that effect, the works of Ohm,6 Sweeney7 and Schwartz and
2Ibid.
3Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protec-
tion of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), published in Official Journal
of the European Union, L 119, 4 May 2016.
4The term ‘onlife’ was coined by Luciano Floridi and refers to ‘the new experience of a hyperconnected reality
within which it is no longer sensible to ask whether one may be online or offline’ (Luciano Floridi, ‘Introduc-
tion’ in Luciano Floridi (ed), The Online Manifesto. Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era (Springer, 2015), 1).
5Ibid, 2.
6P Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy’ (2010) 57 UCLA L. Rev. 1701, 1742 et seq. and 1759.
7L Sweeney, ‘Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely’ (2000) Carnegie Mellon University,
Data Privacy Working Paper 3 http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/identifiability/paper1.pdf (accessed
18 February 2018).
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Solove8 suggest that, given the progress of data processing technologies and
the amount of data available for analysis, absolute and irreversible anonym-
ity is no longer possible. Tene and Polonetsky note how Big Data analytics
makes a binary distinction between identifiable and non-identifiable infor-
mation meaningless.9 Schwartz and Solove propose to keep personal data
(or personally identifiable information, a functional equivalent of personal
data in the USA) as a threshold of protection, but with a sharper definition,
namely, one based on the risk of identification from ‘0’ (zero risk of identi-
fication) to ‘identified’, and to treat information with varying degrees of
identifiability differently.10 Alongside these suggestions, we should note
that the EU Court of Justice has recently adopted a broad approach to
identifiability in the Breyer case.11
What these authors seem to overlook, however, is that the problem with
the concept of personal data goes beyond simple identifiability, because the
second essential element of the concept of ‘personal data’, ie the relation of
information to a person, is problematic as well.
As I will argue in this paper, in the age of the Internet of Things, datafica-
tion, advanced data analytics and data-driven decision-making, any infor-
mation relates to a person in the sense of European data protection law.
From the perspective of the present and near future of data protection, I
welcome this broad interpretation of personal data and its adoption in the
data protection practice. To be clear, my argument is not made in support
of a narrower concept of personal data, eg akin to personally identifiable
information in the US law.12 Nor do I defend a narrower scope of data pro-
tection. Indeed, if all data has a potential to impact people and is therefore
personal, all data should trigger some sort of protection against possible nega-
tive impacts.13 The broad interpretation of the concept ‘personal data’ and the
resulting broad legal protection are not the core of the problem as I see it. The
problem is that in the circumstances where all data is personal and triggers
data protection, a highly intensive and non-scalable regime of rights and
obligations that results from the GDPR cannot be upheld in a meaningful
way. From the perspective of a more long-term future of data protection
law, while I still support the broad scope of the legal protection that a
broad notion of personal data brings, I want to enter a caution about the
8P Schwartz and D Solove, ‘The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Infor-
mation’ (2011) 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1814, 1877.
9O Tene and J Polonetsky, ‘Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of Analytics’ (2013) 11
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 258.
10Schwartz and Solove (n 8).
11Case C-582/14, Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:779.
12The scope of the notion of personally identifiable information is discussed and criticised at length in Paul
Schwartz and Daniel Solove ‘Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union’
(2014) 102 California Law Review 877.
13But see GJ Zwenne, Diluted Privacy Law. Inaugural Lecture (University of Leiden, 2013) 33 et seq.
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consequences of imposing the same high intensity of obligations in all data
processing situations.
I will start the argument by breaking up the definitions of personal data under
the 1995DataProtectionDirective14 (‘DPD’) and theGDPR todemonstrate how
they are inherently flexible and capable of being stretched to accommodate chan-
ging contexts (Part 2). I will then review how the concept of personal data has
been applied so far, mainly referring to the Article 29 Working Party (‘WP29’)
opinion on the concept of personal data15 (‘WP 136’). The WP136 opinion
will serve as amental scaffolding aroundwhich the paper’s argumentwill be con-
structed. The reason is that albeit not formally binding, the WP136 possesses
undeniable ‘persuasive authority’ and provides the most comprehensive guide-
lines for data controllers as to how they should apply the concept of personal
data in their day-to-day practice. I will show how the notion of personal data
according to the WP136, broadly defined and in light of the rapidly advancing
technology, potentially renders everything personal data and subject to the
data protection regime (Part 3). Yet, only the CJEU has authority to decide
how the definition of ‘personal data’ should be interpreted under EUdata protec-
tion law. Therefore, I will review the CJEU’s case law and examine whether the
Court shares the WP29’s broad reading of the concept ‘personal data’ (Part 4).
I will discuss implications of the analysis for the present and future of data pro-
tection law in Europe (Part 5), followed by a conclusion (Part 6).
2. Definition of personal data in EU data protection law:
flexibility, adaptability, and uncertainty
‘Personal data’ is one of the key notions of data protection law determining
the material scope of the DPD and the GDPR. Only when personal data is
processed do the data protection principles, rights and obligations apply
(Article 3(1) DPD and Article 2(1) GDPR).
Under the GDPR, which closely follows the DPD,16 ‘personal data’ means
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data
subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more
factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cul-
tural or social identity of that natural person.
Anonymous data is the opposite of personal data and refers to information
that does not relate to an identified or identifiable person, or to personal
14Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,
Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995, 0031–0050.
15Article 29 Working Party opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, 20 June 2007 (‘WP 136’).
16Article 4(1) GDPR.
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data ‘rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no
longer identifiable’.17 Processing anonymous data does not trigger application
of data protection law. Pseudonymous data, ie personal data after pseudony-
misation, is still information pertaining to an identifiable person and subject
to data protection law.18
The resulting definition of personal data is broad, flexible, and adaptable to
technological context.19 The references to ‘identifiable natural person’ and
‘information relating to a natural person’ invite interpretation as to what con-
stitutes a relevant possibility of identification and a relevant relationship
between information and an individual.
Recital 26 GDPR adopts a test of reasonable likelihood of identification ‘by
the controller or by another person’, taking into account not the subjective
ability to identify, but the state of art of technology at the time of processing:
To ascertain whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of
all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, by the controller
or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. To
ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used, account should be
taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time
required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology
at the time of the processing and technological developments.
As Schwartz and Solove point out, Recital 26 GDPRmakes the GDPR concept
of ‘personal data’ suitable for ‘a tailored, context-specific analysis for deciding
whether or not personal data is present’.20 The same piece of data can be
anonymous at the time of collection, but turn into personal later, just
sitting there, simply by virtue of technological progress.
In addition to identifiability, ‘relate to’ is another element of the definition
that invites context-dependent assessment. To establish the status of infor-
mation as personal data, whether or not this information relates to a person
has to be considered first, even prior to the identifiability analysis. Like ‘iden-
tifiability’, ‘information relating to’ a natural person may be interpreted
broadly and narrowly, and invites a judgement on what kind and degree of
relationship of information to a person is significant, as well as whether this
relationship is present under particular circumstances. Neither the DPD nor
the GDPR gives any guidelines as to how ‘relating to’ is to be understood.
Due to the flexibility of the definition in the DPD, and despite the DPD
being an instrument of complete harmonisation, there has been a significant
17Recital 26 DPD and Recital 26 GDPR.
18Recital 26 GDPR; ‘pseudonymisation’ means ‘the processing of personal data in such a manner that the
personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional infor-
mation, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and
organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifi-
able natural person’ (Article 4(5) GDPR).
19Schwartz and Solove (n 12), 9 (ssrn pre-print page numbering).
20Schwartz and Solove (n 12), 9 (ssrn page numbering).
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divergence in how the national legislation has so far implemented the defi-
nition of personal data;21 the complete harmonisation only precludes
Member States from adding additional elements to the harmonised pro-
visions, but still allows ‘deciding the details or choosing between options’.22
Also, the Recitals detailing and clarifying the definition of personal data are
non-binding, and the Member States are under no obligation to include
those in their national implementation. It remains to be seen if the choice
of a regulation as a legislative instrument will result in a uniform application
of the GDPR definition of personal data across the EU member states.
3. Weather as personal data? Article 29 working party opinion
3.1. Introducing the WP 136: streamlining national implementation
and relevance after May 2018
To streamline the national implementation of the definition of personal data,
the Article 29 Working Party, an EU advisory authority on the matters of data
protection, adopted a non-binding opinion on the concept of personal data.23
Even though the WP29 opinion concerns the concept of personal data in the
DPD, it will most likely remain significant for data protection compliance
after the GDPR becomes effective, since, as Advocate General Kokott has
observed, ‘the latter will not affect the concept of personal data’.24
The concept ‘personal data’ – as interpreted in the WP136 – lives up to its
potential to become an all-encompassing notion. The WP29 begins with policy
considerations, the most relevant of which for this analysis are that the notion
of personal data is broad, and intends to cover all information which may be
linked to an individual; the DPD is sufficiently flexible to strike a balance
between the data subjects’ rights and legitimate interests of others; while the
DPD aims to protect individuals, the scope of data protection rules should
not be overstretched at the risk of ‘ending up applying data protection rules
to situations which were not intended to be covered by those rules and for
which they were not designed by the legislator’; at the same time, unduly restric-
tive interpretation of personal data should be avoided ‘so that it can anticipate
evolutions and catch all “shadow zones” within its scope’.25
WP29 breaks up the definition of personal data into four elements. Per-
sonal data is: (a) information, (b) relating to (c) an identified or identifiable
21WP 136 (n 15), 3. The UK implementation of the definition is one of the most restrictive: see Christopher
Millard and W Kuan Hon, ‘Defining ‘Personal Data’ in e-Social Science’ (2012) 15(1) Information, Com-
munication and Society 66 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809182 (accessed 18 February 2018).
22Viviane Reding, ‘The European data Protection Framework for the Twenty-First Century’ (2012) 2(3) Inter-
national Data Privacy Law 121; Case C-468/10 ASNEF, ECLI:EU:C:2011:777 [35].
23WP 136 (n 15).
24Case C-434/16 Peter Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:994, Opinion of Advo-
cate General Kokott [3].
25WP 136 (n 15), 4–5.
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(d) natural person. I will only consider the first three as relevant for the argu-
ment. Pointing to the flaws of the ‘identifiability’ element is less controversial
compared to the other two, so I will start with it.
3.2. ‘Identified or identifiable [natural person]’
The WP29 adopts a broad understanding of what ‘identified or identifiable’
means. ‘Identified’ refers to a person who is known, or distinguished in a
group, and ‘identifiable’ is a person who is not identified yet, but identification
is possible.26 One is directly identified or identifiable most commonly by refer-
ence to a name, in combination with additional information if the name is not
unique;27 one is ‘indirectly identifiable’ by the so-called ‘unique combinations’
of not unique identifiers that allow the individual to be singled out.28
The standard for the relevant possibility of identification adopted by the
WP29 is whether or not the means of identification are ‘reasonably likely to
be used’, as under Recital 26 DPD and the similarly phrased Recital 26
GDPR. The WP29 follows the language of the Recital closely, restating that
the means of identification are ‘reasonably likely to be used by the controller
or any other person’, often interpreted as by anybody,29 which is a significantly
broader interpretation allowing for more data to be considered personal, as
opposed to the narrow ‘by the controller’. The former approach is often
called ‘absolute’, or ‘objective’, and the latter ‘relative’.30
At the same time, the WP29 clarifies that a ‘purely hypothetical possibility’
of identification is insufficient to meet the standard of ‘reasonably likely’.31
Instead, ‘all the factors at stake’ should be considered to assess this possi-
bility.32 Examples of such factors are:
. the cost of identification;
. the intended explicit or implied purpose of processing (when ‘the proces-
sing… only makes sense if it allows identification of specific individuals
and treatment of them in a certain way’33, the availability of tools of identi-
fication should be presumed reasonably likely);
26Ibid, 12.
27Ibid, 13.
28Ibid, 13–14. Later the WP29 recognised cookies as unique identifiers (Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion
16/2011 on EASA/IAB Best Practice Recommendation on Online Behavioural Advertising’ (WP 188) 8
December 2011, 8). For more on ‘singling out’ see FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Singling Out People
Without Knowing Their Names – Behavioural Targeting, Pseudonymous Data, and the new Data Protec-
tion Regulation’ (2016) 32 Computer Law & Security Review 256–271.
29M Taylor, Genetic Data and the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy Protection (Cambridge University
Press, 2012) 140; WG Urgessa, ‘The Protective Capacity of the Criterion of Identifiability under EU
Data Protection Law’ (2016) 2 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 521, 529.
30Eg Zuiderveen Borgesius (n 28) 264.




. the risk of organisational dysfunctions (eg breaches of confidentiality
duties) and technical failures, including data breaches;
. the state of the art in technology at the time of the processing, including poss-
ible technological developments in future, within the lifetime of processing;
. measures to prevent data identification (ie to maintain anonymity) are of
importance as a means of avoiding processing personal data altogether,
rather than in fulfilment of data security obligations under DPD.34
The resulting standard of the reasonable likelihood of identification is quite
broad and context-dependent, leading to one major consequence: the status
of data as ‘personal’ is dynamic, ie the same dataset may not obviously be per-
sonally identifiable at the start of processing, or from the perspective of the
controller, given the tools and data available to him, but become, or appear
to have been all along, identifiable from the perspective of another person
or once the circumstances change.35
It has become a widely accepted point in the privacy and data protection
literature that as the data processing technologies advance, and the pool of
data which can be combined grows, and as combining databases becomes
daily practice of intelligence agencies, ‘smart city’ municipalities, and adver-
tising, so does the reasonable likelihood of somebody being able to link any
piece of information to a person. To name just a few key authors arguing
to that effect, I refer to the works of Ohm,36 Sweeney,37 Schwartz and
Solove,38 and Tene and Polonetsky.39
Data processing practice is rich in examples where data first considered
anonymous was identified. In 2000 the combination of a ZIP code, date of
birth, and gender was enough to identify 87% of the US population.40
Famously, film rating records of 500,000 Netflix subscribers were re-identified
in 2008 using the openly accessible Internet Movie Database.41 In 2013 travel
routes of celebrities such as Bradley Cooper and Olivia Munn, including street
addresses, and whether or not they left a tip, were deduced from the ‘anon-
ymised’ public database of the New York taxi rides which contained no pas-
senger information, and paparazzi pictures.42 In 2014 knowing the location of
credit card holders on four occasions allowed for the re-identification of 90%
34Ibid, 17.
35BJ Koops, ‘The Trouble with European Data Protection Law’ (2014) 4(4) International Data Privacy Law
250.
36Ohm (n 6), 1742 et seq. and 1759.
37Sweeney (n 7).
38Schwartz and Solove (n 8), 1877.
39Tene and Polonetsky (n 9), 258.
40Sweeney (n 7).
41A Narayanan and V Shmatikov, ‘Robust De-Anonymisation of Large Datasets. (How to Break Anonymity
of Netflix Prize Dataset)’ (2008) Proceedings – IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 111–125.
42JK Trotter, ‘Public NYC Taxicab Database Lets You See How Celebrities Tip’ (2014) Gawker 23 October
http://gawker.com/the-public-nyc-taxicab-database-that-accidentally-track-1646724546 (accessed 25
August 2017).
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of 3 months of credit card transactions, chronicling the spending of 1.1
million people in 10,000 shops, having access only to amounts spent, shop
type and a code representing each person. Knowing the amounts spent on
these four occasions led to re-identification of nearly all card-holders.43
The examples demonstrate that the capacity of (re-)identification is
increasing each year, and although perfect identification may still be a
myth today, one wonders for how long. Many legal (eg the often cited
Ohm44) and technical scholars (eg Narayanan45) agree that at this rate, a
meaningful distinction between identifiable and non-identifiable infor-
mation is not sustainable much longer.46 In Europe this conclusion is
further reinforced by the complementary WP29 opinion on anonymisation:
the data is not identifiable, ie anonymous, only when anonymisation is
irreversible.47
3.3. ‘Any information’
Unlike ‘identifiability’, the remaining two elements of the definition receive
little attention in the literature. Yet, as the WP29 interprets them, they signifi-
cantly contribute to the imminent explosion of the kinds of data that can be
considered personal, and are therefore not less controversial. While explain-
ing the meaning of ‘any information’, the WP29 does not examine what infor-
mation means, probably considering it self-evident, and focuses immediately
on what kinds of information would fall under ‘any information’. In the age of
ubiquitous computing and advanced analytics algorithms, this omission may
have a truly explosive effect on the range of situations that would fall within
the scope of data protection law.
3.3.1. Broad but undefined concept of information
WP29 starts with a broad declaration of the intent of the legislator ‘to design a
broad concept of personal data’48 and further explains that any information
can fall under the concept ‘personal data’ regardless of its nature, content,
or format. To be considered personal data, the nature of information is of
no significance: it can be true or inaccurate, objective and subjective, including
opinions and assessments.49
43J Bohannon, ‘Credit Card Study Blows Holes in Anonymity’ (2015) 347(6221) Science Magazine 468.
44Ohm (n 6) 1701.
45A Narayanan and EW Felten, ‘No Silver Bullet: De-Identification Still Doesn’t Work’ (2014) randomwalk-
er.info, published 9 July 2014 http://randomwalker.info/publications/no-silver-bullet-de-identification.
pdf (accessed 18 February 2018).
46But see A Cavoukian and D Castro, ‘Big Data and Innovation, Setting the Record Straight: De-identifi-
cation Does Work’ (2014), www2.itif.org/2014-big-data-deidentification.pdf (accessed 18 February
2018).
47Article 29 Working Party opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, 10 April 2014 (WP 216), 3, 5–7.
48WP 136 (n 15), 6.
49Ibid, 6.
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Next, there are no particular requirements to the content of information.
Information does not have to concern private or family life, and could
pertain to the life of the individual in his or her professional and other
capacities,50 which is consistent with the aim of the DPD to protect ‘the fun-
damental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular [but not
exclusively] their right to privacy’.51
Finally, information can constitute personal data regardless of the format,
medium, or form, which could be ‘alphabetical, numerical, graphical, photo-
graphical or acoustic’, ‘kept on paper [or] stored in a computer memory’ as a
binary code,52 structured or unstructured,53 provided the other criteria of the
definition are met. Video and voice recording can be such information, as well
as a child’s drawing that could contain personal data of both the child and the
parents.54
Aside from this, the explanation by WP29 refers to ‘information’ as a
concept the meaning of which is self-evident. In any case, no further clarifica-
tion as to what is meant by ‘information’, and how it relates to or differs from
other information-related concepts, such as ‘data’, ‘meaning’, ‘knowledge’, or
information artefacts (‘information carriers’, eg books, CDs, etc.), is given.55
The only exception is a short paragraph regarding human tissue samples.
According to WP29, these are ‘sources’ of biometric data but ‘not biometric
data themselves.’56
Therefore the extraction of information from the samples is collection of per-
sonal data, to which the rules of the Directive apply. The collection, storage and
use of tissue samples themselves may be subject to separate sets of rules.57
This paragraph suggests that the samples are information carriers, like eg
CDs, rather than information. At the same time, the exact wording of the
paragraph is not this explicit. Specifically, a number of questions arise: first,
is there a meaningful difference between tissue samples and the child’s
drawing that the WP29 used earlier as an example of information and not
a source of information, when both do not provide information immediately
but require ‘information extraction’; second, if the tissue samples ‘are not bio-






55Bygrave considers it problematic that the legal definition of personal data is ‘creeping’ from the intan-
gible world onto the world of biomaterial (L Bygrave, ‘Information Concepts in Law: Generic Dreams and
Definitional Daylight’ (2015) 35(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 91–120); WG Urgessa, ‘The Feasibility of
Applying EU Data Protection Law to Biological Materials: Challenging ‘Data’ as Exclusively Informational’
(2016) 7 JIPITEC 96.
56WP 136 (n 15), 9.
57Ibid.
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additional information or in a certain technological context; and third, if the
collection, storage and use of such samples ‘may be subject to separate sets of
rules’, are those rules in addition to data protection, lex specialis in relation to
the general rules of the DPD, or does the data protection law not apply?
3.3.2. ‘Everything is information’
The striking consequence of the declared commitment of WP29 to the all-
encompassing interpretation of ‘any information’ and the vagueness of the
WP136 on the meaning of information is that a viable argument can be
built that everything is or at least contains information.
Information is a notoriously nebulous concept that has different meanings.
These meanings vary over time, across and within disciplines as diverse as
philosophy, psychology and cybernetics, or depending on one’s philosophical
inclination,58 resulting in what Burgin calls ‘information studies perplexity’.59
To use Burgin’s illustration, a popular definition of information (‘infor-
mation is the eliminated uncertainty’60) is based on Claude Shannon’s infor-
mation theory,61 which represents a statistical approach to information.62
This theory and the information definitions based on it are criticised for com-
pletely ‘ignoring the human aspect of information’ and misleading social
sciences and humanities.63 Yet, Claude Shannon never intended to develop
a theory of information (it was originally called ‘communication theory’
and was relabelled by his followers later) or define what information is.64
Some scholars define information through knowledge or data, and others
define knowledge and data in terms of information.65
While law is generally characterised by poor conceptualisation of infor-
mation,66 several analyses have adopted a General Definition of Information
(‘GDI’) as an operational standard: ‘information is data + meaning’.67 Data is
the first element of the definition and stands for the lack of uniformity in the
58L Floridi, ‘Philosophical Conceptions of Information’ in Giovanni Sommaruga (ed), Formal Theories of
Information: From Shannon to Semantic Information Theory and General Concepts of Information
(Springer, 2009), 13–53, 16; P Adriaans, ‘Information’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013)
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/information (accessed 18 February 2018).
59M Burgin, Theory of Information. Fundamentality, Diversity and Unification (World Scientific Publishing,
2010) 6.
60Ibid, 6, referring to RV Hartley, ‘Transmission of information’ (1928) 7 The Bell System Technical Journal
335–363 and AD Ursul, Information (Nauka, 1971, in Russian).
61CE Shannon, ‘A mathematical theory of communication’ (1948) 27 The Bell System Technical Journal 379–
423.
62Burgin (n 59) 6.
63Ibid, 6, citing L Brillouin, Science and Information Theory (Academic Press, 1956).
64Burgin (n 59) 6.
65Ibid, 7 and in-text references therein on knowledge, and 192 on the relationship between information
and data (eg ‘information is data + meaning’ vs ‘data is potential information’).
66For an elaborate discussion of the concept of information in law see Bygrave (n 55) 91–120; examples of
legal arguments against defining information in law in Bygrave (n 55), footnotes 5 and 6.
67L Floridi, ‘Is Information Meaningful Data?’ (2005) 70(2) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 351–
370.
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world (what Floridi poetically calls ‘the fractures in the fabric of being’68), or
between at least two physical states (a higher or lower charge in a battery), or
between two symbols (letters A and B, or numerals 0 and 1).69 Put differently,
data is ‘a description of something that allows it to be recorded, analysed, and
reorganized’.70 Meaning is the second element of the GDI. To perceive data as
information we need to make sense of it. For instance, we understand combi-
nations of letters as words and sentences, or observe that the battery charge is
low and conclude that the battery will soon need to be recharged.
While the definition of information as data +meaning has been broadly
adopted,71 others disagree and reject the idea that information is always
meaningful to those who use it. As Hildebrandt explains,72
Though many organisms do not speak our type of language, they all depend on
information to survive and flourish. Artificial intelligence similarly depends on
the processing of information (in the form of digital data points). Neither in the
case of organisms nor in the case of intelligent machines does information
necessarily imply the attribution of meaning, as it may in the case of humans.73
In other words, meaning is a function of ‘the curious entanglement of self-
reflection, rational discourse and emotional awareness’ that is (still) a
human prerogative, and cannot be a defining element of information which
non-humans (animals and machines) process, too.74 This is a part of a
long-standing debate about whether or not information belongs exclusively
to the domain of human society, or is to be found everywhere in the uni-
verse.75 It appears that a growing number of physicists ‘define the physical
world as being made of information itself’ and some even argue that the
so-called ‘structural and kinetic information is an intrinsic component of
the universe […] independent of whether any form of intelligence can per-
ceive it or not’.76
It is beyond the ambition of this paper to jump down the rabbit hole of the
various definitions of information, meaning and data, in search of the most
correct ones. It suffices to point out that adopting a broad approach to infor-
mation as the WP29 does leaves the concept of personal data wide open to
potentially apply to literally everything, provided other conditions are met.
68Floridi (n 58) 17.
69Ibid.
70V Mayer-Schönberger and K Cukier, Big Data: A revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and
Think (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), Chapter 5 (e-book).
71Burgin (n 59) 188 et seq brings a number of examples.
72M Hildebrandt, ‘Law As Computation in the Era of Artificial Legal Intelligence. Speaking Law to the Power
of Statistics’ (forthcoming) University of Toronto Law Journal 10, also see references in fn 48 https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2983045 (accessed 18 February 2018).
73Ibid.
74Ibid, 10.
75Burgin (n 59) 33.
76Ibid, and in-text references.
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If we adopt the broadest understanding of information as adopted eg by
Hildebrandt, ie not dependent on human thinking, then ‘the whole nature
is a huge system of information processes’, what Wheeler, a prominent phy-
sicist, calls ‘from It to Bit’,77 where ‘each physical situation […] emerges from
the flow of information, generates information and gives information to the
environment’.78 In other words, everything is information; it is impossible
to distinguish between a tree and information about a tree for a tree is
made of information.
If we adopt a narrower understanding of information dependent on
humans or other recipients attributing meaning or significance to data, ie
the so-called semantic concept of information epitomised in the GDI, the fol-
lowing argument unfolds.79 Information is data +meaning or significance.
People measured and quantified the world long before the Digital Age, eg
in the form of maths and language. However, the arrival and proliferation
of computing turbocharged this process, enabling the measurement and
quantification of, and hence the harnessing of data from, literally every-
thing.80 Hence, everything can be a source of data. But to be information,
does all data have meaning or significance? This depends on the recipient.
As Burgin explains, the same information can have no or various meanings
depending on who perceives it. For instance a text in Chinese only has
meaning to a speaker of Chinese, and a paper on mathematics has no or
different meaning to a lay reader, high-level mathematician, or a mathematics
major.81 Human mentality82 is seen by some (eg Hildebrandt) as the precon-
dition for a meaning to occur, while others see computers having mentality as
well in the form of everything in the computer’s memory.83 Human mentality
is limited in the extent to which it can make sense of data. Some data collo-
quially referred to as ‘raw’ has no or very limited meaning in human percep-
tion, like zeros and ones of a binary code. The way all computers attach
meaning to data is different from human cognition, eg computers have a
different language and process data faster. Humans – albeit with proper
77JA Wheeler, ‘Information, Physics, Quantum: The Search for Links’, in WH Zurek (ed), Complexity, Entropy,
and the Physics of information (Addison-Wesley, 1989), 3–28.
78Burgin (n 59) 34 citing T Stonier, Information and Meaning: An Evolutionary Perspective (Springer, 1997).
79The semantic concept of information is heavily criticised for a presumption that data is meaningless:
‘[T]here are no “raw” data as any observable, measurable and collectible fact has been affected by
the very knowledge that made this fact observable, measurable and collectible’ (Burgin (n 59) 197).
80Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 70).
81Burgin (n 59) 9–10, 94, citing CT Meadow and W Yuan, ‘Measuring the Impact of Information: Defining
the Concepts’ (1997) 33(6) Information Processing and Management 697–714 and Fred Dretske, Knowl-
edge and the Flow of Information (Basil Blackwell, 1981).
82Mentality is a part of the so-called ‘Existential Triad of the world’ which describes the world’s structure:
physical world, mental world and the world of structures (Burgin (n 59) 60). The Existential Triad is based
on Popper’s triad of the world: physical objects or states, consciousness or psychical states, and intellec-
tual contents of books, documents, scientific theories, etc. (KR Popper, ‘Replies to my critics’, in PA
Schilpp (ed), The Philosophy of Karl Popper (Open Court, 1974) 949–1180.
83Burgin (n 59) 61.
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training and effort – can still follow how traditional computers make sense of
data: these computers follow deductive models, rules and cases.84 However,
how meaning is ‘attached’ to data by modern machines is beyond the grasp
of human mind.85 The game-changer is a new generation of data-processing
algorithms based on machine learning. Machine learning is the ability of com-
puter algorithms to learn from data and make predictions for new situ-
ations,86 and improve automatically through experience.87 The new
algorithms are autonomous, ie self-learning, self-repairing, and self-mana-
ging, and form the core of the modern approach to Artificial Intelligence
(‘AI’), a strand of computer science aiming to build computers as intelligent
agents. The way advanced AI self-learning algorithms make sense of data is
not transparent even for their designers. Hence, the new AI algorithms
work as a black box that is truly beyond human cognition.88 These AI self-
learning autonomous machines together with unprecedented amount of
data already stored in databases or live-streamed form the essence of Big
Data89 and have the ability to harness information in fundamentally novel
ways.90 In effect, we can no longer say that some data has no meaning for
we really have lost to computers the monopoly of deciding that. In fact, it
is safer to assume that all data – the number and frequency of steps or key
strokes one makes daily, the colour of one’s eyes or even how many leaves
grow on a tree – potentially has meaning, even if not for humans. Hence,
everything is data and all data has meaning; hence, everything is or contains
information.
3.4. ‘Relating to’
What ‘relating to’means, according to WP29, is ‘crucial as it is very important
to precisely find out which are the relations/links [between the information
and the individual] that matter and how to distinguish them’.91 Again, the
WP29 construes ‘relating to’ very broadly.
WP29 points out that in some situations this relationship is quite obvious,
while in others the link is not self-evident. In particular, the latter is the case
84M Hildebrandt, ‘Slaves to Big Data. Or Are We?’ (2013) 16 IDP Revista De Internet, Derecho Y Política http://
works.bepress.com/mireille_hildebrandt/52/ (accessed 10 October 2017).
85M Hildebrandt, ‘The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era’ in J. Bus et al (eds), Digital
Enlightenment Yearbook (IOS Press, 2012), 53; JP Van Bendegem, ‘Neat Algorithms in Messy Environ-
ments’ in M Hildebrandt and S Gutwirth (eds), Profiling the European Citizen. Cross-Disciplinary Perspec-
tives (Springer, 2008), 80–83.
86Jelena Stajic, Richard Stone, Gilbert Chin, and Brad Wible, ‘Rise of the Machines’ (2015) 349(6245) Science
248–249.
87MI Jordan and TM Mitchell, ‘Machine Learning: Trends, Perspectives, and Prospects’ (2015) 349(6245)
Science 255.
88Hildebrandt (n 85), Van Bendegem (n 85).
89Hildebrandt (n 84).
90Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (n 70).
91WP 136 (n 15), 9.
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where information relates to an object, eg the value of a house, or a process or
event, eg data on the functioning of a machine that requires human interven-
tion. In these cases there would be an indirect relationship to people owning
or otherwise interacting with the object. Presumably, WP29 considers the
indirect relationship sufficient. In all cases, all circumstances of the case
need to be taken into account in assessment.92
Information can ‘relate’ to an individual in content, purpose, or result,
meaning that information ‘relating to’ a natural person includes but is
broader than the information ‘about’ that person. The meaning of ‘relating
to’ grows even broader considering that these three conditions are meant as
alternative and not as cumulative ones.93
Information relates to a person more obviously in content, ie when it is
about that person. However, even the information that is not in any way
about someone may be found to ‘relate to’ a person. Information relates to
a person in purpose ‘when the data are used or are likely to be used…with
the purpose to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence the status or behav-
iour of an individual’94 [emphasis added]. Finally, information regardless of
its content or any purpose of processing may relate to a person in result
when ‘[its] use is likely to have an impact on a certain person’s rights and
interests’.95 According to the WP29, the relevant impact does not have to
be ‘major’,96 which I understand to mean that the information relates to a
person by reason of impact even if it is likely to affect that person in only a
minor way. WP29 further clarifies that ‘[i]t is sufficient if the individual
may be treated differently from other persons as a result of the processing
of such data’.97
Remarkably, similar to the criterion of identifiability, the relationship by
reason of purpose and result will occur not only when data is already used,
but also where it is likely to be used with the purpose or effect of impacting
people ‘taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the precise
case’.98 I have already discussed how the reference to likelihood results in
the standard of the reasonable likelihood of identification that is both
broad and context-dependent, making the status of data as ‘personal’
dynamic (see 3.2). The same argument equally applies here, with a significant
correction: while the likelihood of identification under Recital 26 must be
‘reasonable’, whichWP29 interprets as more than a purely hypothetical possi-
bility, there is no such clarification here, and hence a lower threshold of what









In other words, some information is perceived as relevant more easily, for
instance, information ‘generated’ by (observing) people (eg administrative
records of people’s offline lives, and digital records of online behaviour
such as websites visited, texts and images uploaded; information generated
through use of ‘smart’ objects and devices such as phones or fitness bracelets),
or objects people interact with (their cars, homes, computers). At the same
time, some information is hard to intuitively place in any connection of rel-
evance for anyone: eg the amount of weight a block of concrete can withstand,
or the number of sand crystals in a cubic metre of sand in the Sahara desert.
However, when increasing amounts of data are gathered in real time from
increasingly connected environments, intended to be used in automated
decision-making about us, and we do not know how the autonomous self-
learning and self-managing computers draw meaning from data, we should
always reasonably assume that any information is likely to relate to a
person, since we cannot eliminate this possibility with certainty. The latter
point requires further elaboration.
Not all information relates to people by reason of its content, eg is of bio-
graphical significance, describes a person or conveys a fact from someone’s
life or assessment of a person. However, in the emerging world of data-
driven decision-making, cyber-physical infrastructures and what Hildebrandt
calls ‘data-driven agency’,99 any information can relate to a person by reason
of purpose, and all information relates to a person by reason of impact.
The relationship by reason of a purpose, as the WP29 explains it, occurs
‘when the data are used or are likely to be used…with the purpose to evaluate,
treat in a certain way or influence the status or behaviour of an individual’.100
This essentially describes the relationship of information to a person in terms
of intended impact. By now much of the information is processed specifically
with the intent to impact people in the way theWP29 describes, ie ‘to evaluate,
treat in a certain way or influence the status or behaviour’. For instance, to
treat in a certain way or influence human behaviour (eg trigger people to
buy a certain product or conserve energy) is the chief reason for information
collection and further processing on the ad-powered Internet and in the
context of the data-driven (or algorithmic) regulation.101 The ultimate desti-
nation, however, is the world of data-driven agency, which Hildebrandt
defines as ‘a specific type of artificial intelligence, capable of perceiving an
99‘Data-driven agency refers to a specific type of artificial intelligence, capable of perceiving an environ-
ment and acting upon it, based on the processing of massive amounts of digital data’ (M Hildebrandt
‘Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency’ (2016) 79(1) MLR 4).
100WP 136 (n 15), 10.
101Yeung defines algorithmic regulation through algorithmic decision-making: ‘Algorithmic decisionmak-
ing refers to the use of algorithmically generated knowledge systems to execute or inform decisions,
which can vary widely in simplicity and sophistication. Algorithmic regulation refers to regulatory gov-
ernance systems that utilize algorithmic decisionmaking.’ K Yeung, ‘Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical
Interrogation’ (forthcoming) Regulation & Governance doi:10.1111/rego.12158.
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environment and acting upon it, based on the processing of massive amounts
of digital data’.102 A ‘smart’ city where all aspects of the environment and
people living in it are datified, and the inhabitants are subjected to a certain
treatment in real time based on processing of the data, from the speed at
which escalators are running to promote physical activity to the warmth
and intensity of street lighting to prevent undesirable behaviour to targeted
policing, would be an example of such data-driven agency. As our homes
and cities are increasingly being made ‘smart’, laced with the network of com-
municating sensors built into the infrastructure, mobile phones, toys and
appliances, and as information technology is increasingly mediating our
daily functioning, the onlife world of data-driven agency materialises more
clearly. At present, the ‘narratives of a frictionless world that surreptitiously
adjusts the environment to the needs and desires of its users’103 are steadily
on the way out of the realm of science fiction.104 In such a world, any infor-
mation within the ‘smart’ environment can be used and all information is
likely to be used with the purpose of adapting the environment and impacting
people.
Finally, information regardless of its content or purpose of processing may
relate to a person in result when ‘[its] use is likely to have an impact on a
certain person’s rights and interests’ even in a minor way, eg different treat-
ment.105 This describes the relationship of information to a person in terms of
the impact that is inadvertent rather than intended. The hyper-connected
world of the data-driven agency described above provides fertile ground for
such accidental impact. Indeed, unpredictability of outcomes is considered
one of the characteristic features of the advanced data analytics running at
the back-end of this world.106 This is also why some argue that Big Data ana-
lytics powered by machine learning is at odds with the purpose limitation
principle of data protection. Hence, all information in the context of the
data-driven agency relates to people by reason of impact.
Hildebrandt has recently questioned the assumption of unpredictability of
machine learning. She argues that ‘the methodological integrity of the
machine learning requires advance specification of the purpose as this will
102Hildebrandt (n 99), 4.
103Ibid.
104In addition to fully adaptive digital environments, the vision of fully adaptive physical environments is
also already here. Eg Maas et al sketch a fictional scenario of the cities of the future built of a fictional
Barba material that can be programmed to easily transform itself in real time to meet our desires and
needs, eg for more or different space. The book explores how modern developments in robotics,
material science and computing can enable this scenario and supports the vision with programming
experiments and applied prototypes. The book is based on a series of projects where the Delft University
of Technology, ETH Zürich and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology collaborated (W
Maas et al, Barba. Life in the Fully Adaptable Environment (nai010, The Why Factory 2015).
105WP 136 (n 15), 11.
106See eg T Zarsky, ‘Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data’ (2017) 47 Seton Hall Law Review 995,
1005 (‘Big Data involves methods and usage patterns which neither the entity collecting the data nor the
data subject considered or even imagined at the time of collection.’).
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inform the solidity and productivity of the relevant research design’.107 If this
is the case, it should be possible to distinguish between the information that
will be likely to impact people, and the information that will not. Specifying
the intended outcome of data analytics may be good science or, in Hildeb-
randt’s words, an ‘agonistic’ approach to machine learning.108 Yet, this does
not negate my argument until advance purpose specification and discarding
accidental outcomes become practice. In fact, the almost religious belief in
the unpredictability and nearly magic powers of the Big Data to see previously
unseen patterns and ‘generate insights that were previously impossible, with
the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy’ forms what Boyd and Crawford
call ‘mythology’ of Big Data which has become a constitutive element of
the phenomenon ‘Big Data’ next to the large data sets, computational
power and advanced algorithms.109 All information is likely to have an
impact on people as long as this mythology has a tangible effect on how
data analytics is used.
3.5. Playing devil’s advocate: weather is personal data
While the preceding analysis covered the elements of the definition of per-
sonal data according to the WP29 and looked into the future of the
concept in the emerging onlife world, this section will focus on the present.
I will demonstrate with the use of a provocative example how information
which intuitively is far from being ‘personal’ can be plausibly argued to fit
the definition and hence is ‘personal data’.
Weather, while neutral and of no consequence as a subject of small talk,
may be considered information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person in the context of a living lab, for instance the Stratumseind
2.0 smart city project in Eindhoven, the Netherlands.110 In short, Stratum-
seind is the longest ‘going-out’ street in the Netherlands, with many bars
and ‘coffeeshops’. The area struggles with the declining numbers of visitors
and a decrease in turnover of the local businesses. Criminal behaviour and
vandalism on the street are seen to cause the problem. In response, the muni-
cipality of Eindhoven, together with the police and a number of private parties
(the Stratumseind establishments association, real estate owners, etc.),
initiated a smart city project Stratumseind 2.0. The project includes a
number of smaller data-driven projects, some of which aim at predicting,
107M Hildebrandt, ‘Privacy as Protection of the Incomputable Self: Agonistic Machine Learning’ (forthcom-
ing) Theoretical Inquiries in Law, available online https://ssrn.com/abstract=3081776, 13 (SSRN page
numbering).
108Ibid.
109D Boyd and K Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data. Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and
Scholarly Phenomenon’ (2012) 15(5) Information, Communication & Society 663.
110In the factual description of Stratumseind 2.0 I refer to the ongoing PhD research of Maša Galic on
privacy and big data-based security in public spaces.
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preventing and de-escalating deviant behaviour on the street, among other
things, by engaging the police or adapting the street lighting. Private compa-
nies such as Atos, Intel and Philips see Stratumseind as a test-bed for their
smart-city products and supply the technology enabling the projects.
The data is gathered from the multiple sensors installed on the street,
including video- and acoustic cameras, sound sensors, WiFi tracking and a
weather station. These sensors, among others, measure how many people
pass by the street per day, how they move, where they come from, sound
on the street, what it is and where it comes from, rainfall per hour, tempera-
ture, wind direction and speed. All the data is stored in a database which
enables knowledge discovery, although the actual currently performed analy-
sis is limited.
Would rainfall per hour, temperature, wind direction and speed, together
referred to as ‘weather’, be personal data following the WP29 guidelines? I
would argue that they are. The weather is information if we adopt an
approach to information as an omnipresent and all-encompassing phenom-
enon, captured by Wheeler’s ‘from It to Bit’.111 Alternatively, according to
the semantic definition of information, weather contains information
because it is observed and recorded by the weather station, ie ‘datified’.
Both interpretations fit the broad approach of the WP29. Although not
about people, this information is collected in a database that is likely to be
used for a purpose to assess and influence their (deviant) behaviour, and
hence it is information relating to people in purpose. In the context of a
large knowledge-discovery database built for advanced data analytics, by
several different public and private parties with varying interests, it is possible
to imagine that not all results of data analytics pertaining to human behaviour
on the street would be intended, in terms of both the opaqueness and unpre-
dictability of the advanced analytics algorithms and the possible lack of absol-
ute agreement between the involved parties on their intentions. In that aspect,
the weather information will still be relating to people in impact. Finally, each
visitor to Stratumseind is highly likely to be identifiable if not by the weather
information alone, certainly in combination with the data from the WiFi
tracking sensors, voice recordings or video footage; if not by a weather
station operator, certainly by some other project partners who, being technol-
ogy companies, possess the tools and expertise to do so. Alternatively, since
the purpose of the project is not only to predict but also to address criminal
and other deviant behaviour, this implies that the perpetrators’ identification
is intended. Hence, the identification is ‘reasonably likely’, as the WP29
explains. Therefore, under these circumstances, depending on the approach
to information, either weather itself is information or information about
weather is information that relates to a number of personally identifiable
111Wheeler (n 77) 3–28.
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natural persons, and is personal data. A similar argument may be constructed
in relation to waste water, should the project partners decide to include the
data from monitoring the sewer (eg for the purpose of detecting drug labs)
in the database.
An objection may be raised that the weather and waste water could only be
brought in relationship to an identifiable person and hence be or contain
personal data in very particular circumstances of what Cavoukian and
Castro call ‘high-dimensional data’, which ‘consists of numerous data
points about each individual, enough that every individual’s record is
likely to be unique, and not even similar to other records’.112 However, as
Narayanan and Felten explain, ‘high-dimensional data is now the norm,
not the exception.… [T]hese days it is rare for useful, interesting datasets
to be low-dimensional’.113
This weather example may come across as provocative, but illustrates a real
pattern, a general direction in which the concept of personal data is develop-
ing. More and more situations will constitute processing of personal data as
interpreted by the WP29 until the onlife world will eventually stop being a
scenario of the (near) future and become reality. This will eventually turn
data protection law into an uneconomical exercise of regulating everything,
and deprive its protection of meaning. As a result, the current personal
data-centred paradigm of legal protection will not be sustainable in the
long run.114
4. The Court of Justice case law
4.1. The significance of the WP29 opinions for the Court of Justice’s
jurisprudence
This part will examine whether the trend of data protection law turning
into the law of everything is materialising in the case law of the EU Court
of Justice, ie if the Court’s interpretation of ‘personal data’ is in line with
WP29.
As explained earlier, while the WP29 opinions are highly influential in data
protection practice and are key compliance guidelines, they are not a source of
data protection law and not binding. Under Article 29(1) DPD, the role of the
Working Party is ‘advisory’. Therefore, when ruling on the meaning of per-
sonal data, the Court is free to set aside WP29 opinions, including the
WP136. As a matter of fact, the Court never cites WP29 opinions in its
data protection jurisprudence,115 and on a number of occasions has ruled
contrary to the WP29’s earlier opinions. A recent example is the Google
112Narayanan and Felten (n 45).
113Ibid.
114Part 5 explains why data protection law as ‘the law of everything’ is problematic.
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Spain case, where the Court found search engine providers to be controllers
with regard to indexing and making available via its search personal data pub-
lished on third-party websites.116 Hereby, without expressly mentioning it, the
Court overruled the earlier position adopted by the WP29 on two points: first,
that the search engine providers cannot be ‘the principal controller’ when they
act ‘purely as an intermediary’ with regard to the third-party content contain-
ing personal data, and second, that the search engine providers can only be
controllers ‘with regard to the removal of personal data from their index
and search results, [while] the extent to which an obligation to remove or
block personal data exists, may depend on the general tort law and liability
regulations of the particular Member State’.117
At the same time, Advocates General (‘AGs’) in their opinions for the
Court do, although not always, refer to the WP29.118 Hence the WP136
may still be of indirect influence on how the concept ‘personal data’ develops
in the case law, if not in terms of substantive outcomes, surely in terms of pro-
viding the AGs and the Court with a list of issues to consider.
4.2. The development of the Court of Justice’s case law on the concept
of personal data
This section will very briefly sketch the development of the EU case law on the
meaning of personal data from Lindqvist until roughly 2014, focusing on the
big lines rather than exhaustive description. The year 2014 is chosen as a mile-
stone as it marks a different stage in the Court of Justice case law. This was the
year when the Court for the first time engaged in a discussion of an element of
the definition of personal data and produced extensive analysis of the
meaning of ‘information relating to’ a person in YS and others.
The Court of Justice ruled on the meaning of personal data in the Direc-
tive in its very first data protection case, Lindqvist,119 and on a number of
occasions since then. However, the Court’s judgments are not nearly as
comprehensive as the WP136. Part of the reason is that nearly all of
them are given in the context of a reference for preliminary ruling. While
it is true that the Court often reformulates the questions asked, it remains
constrained by the questions from the national courts and the circumstances
of each case.
115A search done on 28 August 2017 for ‘Article 29 Working Party’ using the http://curia.europa.eu search
tool, under ‘data protection’ subject matter, resulted in four hits, all opinions of Advocates General and
no judgments of the Court.
116Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario
Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 [31] et seq.
117Article 29 Working Party Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines, adopted
on 4 April 2008 (WP 148), 14.
118Most recently Breyer (n 11), Opinion of Advocate General Sanchez-Bordona; and Nowak (n 24), Opinion
of Advocate General Kokott.
119Case C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12992.
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In its case law the Court often states that the scope of the Directive is very
wide and that the personal data covered by the Directive is varied.120 Most of
the relevant cases simply name a particular type of data involved, ruling that
this information indeed constitutes personal data. There is no discussion of
what elements the concept of personal data entails and what each of those
elements should mean. In YS and others, AG Sharpston121 gives some
examples of such types of data which the Court has explicitly pronounced per-
sonal: ‘the name of a person in conjunction with his telephone coordinates or
information about his working conditions or hobbies’,122 his address,123 his
daily work periods, rest periods and corresponding breaks and intervals,124
monies paid by certain bodies and the recipients,125 amounts of earned or
unearned incomes and assets of natural persons.126
Only relatively recently, as the data processing situations which the
national courts deal with have become more complex, have the courts
begun to refer questions that require a more detailed analysis of what particu-
lar elements of the concept ‘personal data’mean. The subsequent sections will
analyse the EUCJ’s case law that resulted, specifically, Breyer, YS and others
and Nowak. The analysis will show that the case law of the Court of Justice
is either in line with the broad approach to the notion of personal data that
the WP29 adopts, or has limited potential to avert the imminent explosion
of the situations falling within the scope of data protection law.
4.3. Case law on the scope of data protection and unreasonable and
disproportionate legal consequences
As the notion of personal data largely determines the material scope of data
protection law, construing the elements of personal data broadly inevitably
results in delineating the scope of data protection law widely. The Court
has dealt with the argument that interpreting the scope of the DPD too
broadly would lead to outcomes which are unreasonable and disproportion-
ate. For instance, in Lindqvist, the argument on behalf of Mrs Lindqvist was
that it was ‘unreasonable to take the view that the mere mention by name of a
person or of personal data in a document… on an internet page constitutes
120Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-139/01 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others [2003] ECR I-4989
[43]; Lindqvist (n 119) [88]; and Case C-553/07 College van burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v
M.E.E. Rijkeboer [2009] ECR I-3889, [59].
121Joint cases C-141/12 and C- 372/12 YS and M. and S. v Minister of Immigration, Integration and Asylum
[2016], ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston [44].
122Lindqvist (n 119) [24].
123Rijkeboer (n 120) [62].
124Case C-342/12 Worten Equipamentos para o Lar SA v Autoridade para as Condições de Trabalho (ACT)
[2013] OJ C225/37, [19], [22].
125Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others (n 120) [64].
126Case C-73/07 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia [2008] ECR I-09831, [35], [37].
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automatic processing of data’.127 In the more recent Google Spain case, AG
Jääskinen submitted that
the broad definitions of personal data, processing of personal data and control-
ler are likely to cover an unprecedently wide range of new factual situations… .
This obliges the Court to apply […] the principle of proportionality, in inter-
preting the scope of the Directive in order to avoid unreasonable and excessive
legal consequences.128
However, in both cases, the Court did not accept that the proportionality and
‘reasonableness’ had to be taken into account at the stage of determining the
Directive’s scope. Rather, according to Lindqvist, the Directive itself has a
degree of flexibility129 to enable proportionate application of its rules. In
effect, the principle of proportionality is respected at the stage of national
implementation of the Directive and is secondary to the issue of scope.130
Similarly, in Google Spain the Court did not accept the proportionality argu-
ment, given the aim of the Directive ‘to ensure a high level of protection of the
fundamental rights and freedoms…with respect to the processing of personal
data’,131 and that in so far as the Directive’s provisions are ‘liable to infringe
fundamental freedoms’, they must be interpreted in the light of fundamental
rights.132 Hence, the position of the Court so far has been that any possible
undesirable impact of the broad application of data protection law should
be mitigated not through narrower interpretation of the scope, but rather
through proportionate application of particular data protection provisions.
The case law on the individual elements of the concept ‘personal data’
largely fits within the same pattern.
4.4. ‘Identified or identifiable’: Breyer
The Court dealt with the meaning of ‘identifiable’ in the reference for a pre-
liminary ruling in the Breyer case. The reference was brought in 2014 and the
ruling was given in 2016. The judgment was generally received as a confir-
mation of the absolute approach to identifiability in EU data protection law
which was first declared in Recital 26 DPD, then adhered to by the WP29,
and finally received the assent of the Court.133 I will argue, however, that
while the Court indeed went for a broad interpretation of identifiability, its
127Lindqvist (n 119) [20].
128Google Spain (n 116), Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen [30].
129Lindqvist (n 119) [83].
130Lindqvist (n 119), [87]–[88].
131Google Spain (n 116), [66].
132Ibid, [68]. For a general discussion of the judgment see O Lynskey, ‘Control over Personal Data in a
Digital Age: Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez’ (2015) 78(3) Modern Law Review 522.
133Eg FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Breyer Case of the Court of Justice of the European Union: IP Addresses
and the Personal Data Definition’ (2017) 3(1) European Data Protection Law Review 130.
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reading is more restrained and measured compared to the WP136, and
narrows down the scope of the concept ‘personal data’ somewhat.
In Breyer, the main dispute concerned Mr Breyer, a German activist, and
the Federal Republic of Germany. The former visited some publicly accessible
websites of the German Federal institutions, and the latter, for the purposes of
preventing denial of service attacks, stored IP addresses of the websites’ visi-
tors, including Mr Breyer’s dynamic IP addresses. Mr Breyer objected to the
retention of his dynamic IP addresses as his personal data.
On an earlier occasion, in Scarlet Extended, the Court had already found
static IP addresses to be personal data for the Internet service provider
‘because they allow users to be precisely identified’ by the Internet service pro-
vider.134 However, Breyer presented a different issue. Namely, unlike a static
IP address ‘which [is] invariable and allow[s] continuous identification’,135 a
dynamic IP address changes each time there is a new Internet connection, and
does not allow a link to be established, ‘through files accessible to the public’,
between a given computer and the Internet connection.136 In fact, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the website provider who kept the IP addresses, could
not identify Mr Breyer through his dynamic IP address137 and would need
additional information in possession of the Internet service provider to be
able to do so. It was ‘common ground’ that a dynamic IP address does not
constitute information relating to an identified natural person, since the iden-
tity of the owner or another user of a computer bearing the IP address is not
directly revealed.138 Hence, the central issue before the Court was whether
such an IP address constitutes information relating to an identifiable
natural person in relation to the website provider where the additional data
necessary for identification of the website visitor was held by the visitor’s
Internet service provider.139
This time, the Court skipped the usual reference to the scope of the Direc-
tive, which is very wide, and the personal data covered by the Directive are
varied.140 The argument developed in several steps: first, to be considered per-
sonal data, it is not necessary for information on its own to allow identifi-
cation of the data subject (this follows from the definition of personal data
as relating to an identifiable person, either directly or indirectly).141 Second,
neither is it necessary ‘that all the information enabling the identification
…must be in the hands of one person’,142 which follows from Recital 26





139Ibid, [39] (emphasis added).
140Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others (n 120) [43]; Lindqvist (n 119) [88]; and Rijkeboer (n 120) [59].
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DPD and its two-fold standard of (1) ‘all the means likely reasonably to be
used’, (2) ‘either by the controller or by any other person.’143 Here the judg-
ment follows the objective, or absolute, approach to defining identifiability
as the WP29 advances in the WP136.
The Court further moved to assess ‘whether the possibility to combine a
dynamic IP address with the additional data held by the Internet service pro-
vider constitutes a means likely reasonably to be used to identify the data
subject’.144 The Court took over the AG’s argument that the possibility of
combining a dynamic IP address with additional data would not be reasonably
likely if it was ‘prohibited by law or practically impossible’ due to ‘a dispropor-
tionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power, so that the risk of identi-
fication appears in reality to be insignificant’.145 Although German law does
not allow the Internet service providers to transfer data to the website provi-
ders, in the event of cyber attacks the website providers can contact a compe-
tent authority who can obtain information from the Internet service providers
to start criminal proceedings. The website provider was found to have the
means reasonably likely to be used to identify the website visitors on the
basis of a dynamic IP address with the help of third parties, namely, the Inter-
net service provider and the competent authority.146 Hence, the dynamic IP
addresses were found to be personal data in this case.
While agreeing with theWP29 on the outcome (both dynamic and static IP
addresses are personal data according to the WP136147), the Court adopts a
more measured approach to what means of identification are reasonably
likely to be used. Namely, in addition to the cost and effort of identification
that the WP29 includes among the factors that need to be taken into
account, the Court considers the factor of legality. By itself, it would not
have any restrictive effect on the scope of personal data compared to the
WP136. Indeed, a legal possibility for the controllers to obtain additional
information that enables them to identify data subjects is merely one of ‘all
the factors at stake’ that should be taken into consideration to assess the possi-
bility of identification according to the WP29.148 The restrictive potential of
Breyer lies in the assessment that starts from what would be unreasonable.
The Court follows the AG’s opinion that identification would not be reason-
ably likely if prohibited by law. This is in direct contradiction to the WP136.
There, the WP29 names the possibility of organisational dysfunction,
meaning also data security breaches resulting from illegal acts, among the rel-
evant factors to be assessed. Indeed, identification can also result from illegal
143Ibid, [42] (emphasis added).
144Ibid, [45] (emphasis added).
145Ibid, [46].
146Ibid, [46]–[49].
147WP 136 (n 15), 16.
148Ibid, 15–16.
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acts, eg hacking. Reflecting on the Court’s argument, a more nuanced reason-
ing would be that a legal prohibition to combine data for identification would
make the means of identification ‘less reasonably likely to be used’, rather than
‘not reasonably likely’.
In addition, the Court does not consider the nature of processing in assess-
ment of identifiability. Namely, under the WP136, the means of identification
should be considered reasonably likely to be used when ‘the processing…
only makes sense if it allows identification of specific individuals and treat-
ment of them in a certain way’.149 It appears from the Court’s reasoning in
para. 47 that, under the circumstances of the case, registering IP addresses
for the purposes of dealing with cyber attacks implies identification, as
there is an established mechanism of identification of the perpetrators by
their IP addresses for the purposes of bringing criminal charges where the
Internet service providers, competent authorities, and the website providers
collaborate. In brief, while the case presented an opportunity for the Court
to confirm or reject the WP29 guideline ‘implied identification = reasonably
likely identification’, the Court chose not to do so.
In sum, what is the impact of the Breyer case on the notion of personal data
in part regarding identifiability? The case certainly reaffirmed the broad
reading by the WP29 of ‘all the means likely reasonably to be used either
by the controller or by any other person’.150 Breyer was the first case where
the Court explicitly stated that it is not necessary ‘that all the information
enabling the identification…must be in the hands of one person’.151 At the
same time, the ruling that a legal ban on identification would make the identi-
fication means not reasonably likely to be used is a notable deviation from the
WP136 and has a potential to limit a number of situations where data is con-
sidered identifiable in Europe. Crucially, this potential should not be overes-
timated. This is mainly because the outcome of the assessment of what the
Court considered ‘identification measures reasonably likely to be taken’ was
phrased by the Court in a manner specifically tailored to the narrow question
posed, and the circumstances of the case. Citing the AG, it was not in dispute
in this case ‘whether the classification of dynamic IP addresses as personal
data is necessary as soon as there is a third party, irrespective of who it
may be, capable of using those dynamic IP addresses to identify network
users’.152 Answering the question posed this way negatively would indeed
have significantly (and undesirably) limited the range of situations where
information would be considered identifiable to a natural person, and
hence personal data. However, the Court did not do so. Hence, the WP136
guidelines on identifiability have not been overruled and are still in play.
149Ibid, 16.
150Breyer (n 11), [42] (emphasis added).
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4.5. ‘Any information’: Nowak
Nowak, decided in December 2017, is significant for European data protection
law in more than one respect. Among other things, it stipulates the conditions
of the data protection rights of access and rectification.153 The case is particu-
larly important for the discussion of the concept ‘personal data’ since it pro-
vides interpretation for two out of three elements of the definition: ‘any
information’ and ‘relating to’. In this section I will focus on the former.
Until recently, the CJEU case law did not engage with the meaning of ‘any
information’. The Court dealt with this issue in Nowak for the first time. The
core of the question before the Court was whether or not examination answers
and examiner’s comments constituted personal data within the meaning of
the DPD, ie any information relating to an identified or identifiable data
subject.
As to the meaning of ‘any information’, the Court ruled:
the expression ‘any information’ […] reflects the aim of the EU legislature to
assign a wide scope to [the concept of personal data], which is not restricted
to information that is sensitive or private, but potentially encompasses all
kinds of information, not only objective but also subjective, in the form of
opinions and assessments.154
This interpretation is in line with the broad approach in the WP136 that any
information can be personal data, regardless of its nature or content. While
under the WP136 information can also be personal data regardless of
format or medium (eg alphabetical, numerical, graphical, photographical or
acoustic, kept on paper or in computer memory),155 the Court is silent in
this regard, and hence the WP136 remains the only compliance guideline
on this matter. Nor did the Court address the gap in the WP136 and stipulate
what information is. As a result, as the law stands, and depending on the
theoretical perspective towards the meaning of information, everything can
still be plausibly argued either to be or to contain information that can be per-
sonal data provided the other requirements of the definition are met.
4.6. ‘Relating to’: YS and others and Nowak
The Court so far has dealt with the meaning of information ‘relating to’ a
person on two occasions. The first one was in 2014 in the joint cases YS
and others.156 There, in a situation where a broad interpretation of personal
data would lead to what the Court saw as unintended results, it deviated
from its earlier approach to interpret the scope of the Directive broadly and
153Nowak (n 24), [46] et seq.
154Ibid, [34].
155WP 136 (n 15), 7.
156YS and others (n 121).
66 N. PURTOVA
consider proportionality of the resulting obligations as a secondary matter.
As a result, the Court adopted a limited interpretation of ‘relating to’
compared to the WP136. Nowak, decided in 2017, effectively reversed this
interpretation.
4.6.1. YS and others
At various stages of the immigration process in the Netherlands, YS, M and S,
third-country nationals, requested access to the ‘minute’ in their immigration
file on the ground of the right of access to their personal data. The ‘minute’ is a
note drafted by an immigration case officer without authority to decide on an
application for a residence permit to motivate his or her recommendation to a
senior officer before he or she makes such a decision. The minute generally
contains three types of information: (1) information relating to the case
officer, ie name, telephone and office number; (2) ‘data relating to the appli-
cant’, including name, date of birth, nationality, gender, ethnicity, religion and
language; procedural history; statements of the documents submitted; and the
applicable law; and (3) the ‘legal analysis’, ie ‘an assessment of the foregoing
information in the light of the applicable legal provisions’.157
Until 14 July 2009, it was the policy of the Dutch government to make a
copy of the minute available upon request. Since then the policy has
changed, and the applicant now receives ‘a summary of the personal data con-
tained in the document’,158 excluding the ‘legal analysis’. YS, M and S were
refused a copy of the full minute, and two sets of proceedings in Dutch
courts have led to the references for a preliminary ruling by the Court of
Justice. One of the central issues before the Court was whether the legal analy-
sis in the minute should be considered personal data. If WP136 were followed,
one would expect a positive answer: the legal analysis in the minute is infor-
mation that is or is likely to be used ‘with the purpose to evaluate, treat in a
certain way or influence the status or behaviour of an individual’,159
namely, the applicant for a residence permit. Yet, the Court answered nega-
tively and concluded that ‘although it may contain personal data, it does
not in itself constitute such data’.160
The Court followed AG Sharpston and used two arguments to support its
interpretation: first, ‘a legal analysis is not information relating to the appli-
cant… , but at most, in so far as it is not… a purely abstract interpretation
of the law, is information about the assessment and application… of that
law to the applicant’s situation’;161 second, granting access rights in relation
to a legal analysis is not compatible with ‘the objective and general scheme’
157Ibid, [14].
158YS and others (n 121), [16]–[17].
159WP 136 (n 15), [10].
160YS and others (n 121), [39] (emphasis added).
161Ibid, [40].
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of the DPD.162 According to the Court, the data subject’s rights in the DPD
exist, among other things, so ‘that person may be certain that the personal
data concerning him are correct and that they are processed in a lawful
manner’, and the right of access exists to enable the data subject ‘to carry
out the necessary checks… to obtain, depending on the circumstances, the
rectification, erasure or blocking of his data’.163 Legal analysis ‘is not in
itself liable to be the subject of a check of its accuracy by that applicant and
a rectification’.164 Crucially, granting such a right of access ‘would not in
fact serve the directive’s purpose of guaranteeing the protection of the…
right to privacy with regard to the processing of data relating to him, but
would serve the purpose of guaranteeing… a right of access to administrative
documents, which is not however covered by Directive 95/46’.165
Consequently, the Court appears to interpret ‘information relating to’ nar-
rowly, as information about an individual, and reject a broader approach of
the WP136 where information can also relate to an individual not by virtue
of its content, but by reason of the purpose or effect of its processing.166
The Court does not refer to the WP136 in its judgment, or phrase the issue
in similar words, ie as a choice between the information about an individual
on the one hand and the information relating to an individual in purpose or
effect on the other. However, it specifically rejects the argument brought on
behalf of M and S that the legal analysis should be considered as relating to
an individual ‘if it is decisive for the assessment of the application… and is
applied to the specific case of the applicant’.167 Thereby the CJEU also
rejects the WP136 understanding of ‘relating to’ in part of relation in
purpose and effect. This is even more evident considering that the Court
follows and explicitly refers to AG Sharpston’s opinion. While not in the para-
graph cited by the Court, AG Sharpston is clear that ‘[in her] opinion, only
information relating to facts about an individual can be personal data.
Except for the fact that it exists, a legal analysis is not such a fact’.168 While
the Court did not adopt this distinction between the facts and analysis,
which would restrict the meaning of ‘information relating to’ even further,
its narrow interpretation was likely to limit the range of situations within
the scope of data protection law.
At the same time, YS and others did not shut the door completely for the
broader interpretation of ‘information relating to’ in line with the WP136. In
fact, the impact of YS and others can be restricted to similar situations only, ie
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involving information used for assessment, are somewhat different from the
facts in YS and others, as appears to be the case in Nowak.
4.6.2. Nowak
In December 2017 the Court revisited the meaning of ‘information relating to’
in Nowak. Similar to YS and others, in a case before the Irish Supreme Court
Mr Nowak requested access to his examination script based on a data protec-
tion right of access to personal data. In its reference for a preliminary ruling
the Irish court essentially asked whether the exam script containing the can-
didate’s answers and the examiner’s comments regarding those answers might
constitute personal data.169 Both the Advocate General in her opinion and the
Court answered positively.
Since the Court followed the opinion of AG Kokott, reviewing the key
arguments of the Advocate General is essential for understanding the
Court’s decision and its impact. The AG’s argument links to the two-fold
argument of the Court in YS and others. First, the AG examines what kind
of a relationship between information and the individual is relevant in the
context of the examination answers and the examiner’s corrections to the
answers. In both contexts the AG’s reasoning is consistent with the WP29
approach to consider information as personal data when it is processed
with a purpose to evaluate the status or behaviour of an individual. Although
the answers are ‘formulated in abstract terms or relate to hypothetical situ-
ations’,170 ‘the script is a documentary record that that individual has taken
part in a given examination and how he performed’.171 While ‘the extent of
the link between an examination candidate and his performance in an exam-
ination’ varies,172 ‘in every case, the aim of an examination […] is to identify
and record the performance of a particular individual, ie the examination can-
didate. Every examination aims to determine the strictly personal and individ-
ual performance of an examination candidate’.173 Therefore, contrary to the
position of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, the personal data in
the script ‘is not confined to the examination result, the mark achieved or
even points scored for certain parts of an examination’.174
A similar assessment is made regarding the examiner’s corrections on the
examination script. The AG explicitly notes that Nowak resembles the case of
YS and others,175 and ‘at the first glance’ the Court’s finding concerning legal
analysis can be transposed to the examiner’s corrections, namely that it is not
information relating to the examination candidate, but ‘at most information







LAW, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 69
about the assessment’.176 However, ‘the purpose of comments is the evalu-
ation of the examination performance and thus they relate indirectly to the
examination candidate.… [C]omments on an examination script are typically
inseparable from the script itself. Precisely because of that close link between
the examination script and any corrections made on it, the latter also are per-
sonal data of the examination candidate […].’177 Consequently, the AG
adheres to the WP29’s understanding of ‘information relating to an individ-
ual’ in terms of purpose twice in one case, with regard to the examination
answers and the examiner’s corrections.
As a second step in the argument, AG Kokott considers the relationship
between the concept of personal data and the purpose of the right of
access, the second pillar of the Court’s position in YS and others. The AG
does not expressly reject the reasoning in YS and others as she notes that
the examination candidate ‘has a legitimate interest, based on the protection
of his private life’ to be able to object to the processing of his or her examin-
ation script outside the examination procedure.178 Yet her further statements
are unequivocal: the purpose of the right of access under the DPD does not
‘preclude the classification of an examination script as personal data’;179
‘the issue of right of access is only secondary’ to the interpretation of the
concept of ‘personal data’;180 and ‘the classification of information as personal
data cannot be dependent on whether there are specific provisions about
access to this information which might apply in addition […]. [N]either
can problems […] with the right of rectification be decisive in determining
whether there exists personal data’.181 In other words, AG Kokott gracefully
incorporated YS and others in her reasoning to the effect that the broad
interpretation of ‘the information relating to an individual’ in terms of
purpose stands.
The CJEU fully embraced the two-fold reasoning of the AG. First, the
Court restated that the notion ‘personal data’ potentially encompasses any
information, as long as it ‘relates’ to the data subject.182 The latter condition
is met where the information is linked to a particular person ‘by reason of its
content, purpose or effect’.183 This understanding is broader than the one
offered by the AG and is a nearly verbatim adaptation by the Court of the
broad interpretation of ‘relate to’ under the WP136.184 In this case, the
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relevant as both the candidate’s answers and the examiner’s comments relate
to the data subject in all three aspects: they reflect the information about the
candidate (his knowledge, thought process and, in the case of a handwritten
answer, information about his handwriting, as well as the examiner’s opinion
regarding the candidate’s performance); the purpose of their processing is to
evaluate the candidate in terms of his professional abilities; and the use of this
information is ‘liable to have an effect on his or her interests’,185 eg determine
his or her employment chances.186 When ruling that the examiner’s com-
ments constitute personal data of the examination candidate, the Court also
did not consider it problematic that these comments relate to the examiner
as well. As the CJEU explains, ‘[t]he same information may relate to a
number of individuals and may constitute for each of them […] personal
data’, provided they are identifiable.187
As a second step in the reasoning, the Court adopted the argument of the
AG as well and ruled that the status of information as personal data ‘cannot be
affected… by the fact that the consequence of that classification is, in prin-
ciple, that the candidate has rights of access and rectification’188 under the
DPD. Indeed, when information is classified as personal data, the entire
body of the data protection guarantees applies, which includes the data
quality and security obligations and also access, rectification, and objection
rights.189 The examination candidate has a legitimate interest based on the
protection of his private life, in exercising his or her rights of access, rectifica-
tion, and objection under data protection law with regard to his or her
answers and the examiner’s comments. For instance, the candidate might
object to processing of the answers and the examiner’s comments outside
the examination procedure,190 or to ensure that the answers of another can-
didate were not ascribed to the candidate at hand, or that the answers of the
candidate were lost, etc.191 The data protection right of erasure might also be
invoked and the answers and comments destroyed when the processing of the
information in the identifiable form is no longer necessary for the purposes
for which the information was collected, eg after the examination procedure
is closed and cannot be challenged.192 Therefore, giving a candidate access
rights under data protection law serves the purpose of data protection law,
ie ‘of guaranteeing the protection of that candidate’s right to privacy […], irre-
spective of whether that candidate does or does not also have such a right of
access under the national legislation applicable to the examination
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procedure’.193 The latter point is in direct contradiction to the Court’s earlier
judgment in YS and others. The Court explicitly notes this contradiction,194
and thus de facto overrules YS and others in this part.
Read together with the opinion of AG Kokott, the Nowak judgement
seriously limits the restrictive potential of YS and others, and allows for the
further use of the wide interpretation of ‘relate to’ under the WP136.
To sum up, the Court generally supports the broad interpretation of iden-
tifiability in Breyer. The Court adopted a restrictive view on what ‘information
relating to’ a person means in YS and others, suggesting that information only
relates to an individual when it is about him or her. Yet in 2017 the CJEU
effectively reversed YS and others and its limited reading of ‘relating to’ in
Nowak and extended the interpretation to include relation by reason of
content, purpose or effect. The Court also ruled that ‘any information’ is to
be interpreted broadly to include information regardless of its nature or
content. As to the format or medium of information or what ‘information’
is, the Court has yet to rule on these matters. If the Court follows its own
case law, I do not expect that the judgments on these issues will be restrictive.
Historically, the Court has considered the material scope of the DPD as very
wide. It is not inclined to narrow the scope down because the legal rights and
obligations that follow appear difficult to comply with, ‘disproportionate’ or
‘unreasonable’. In fact, the Court regards those matters as secondary to the
matter of scope. As a result, the broad interpretation of personal data
under the WP136 still stands. To restate the devil’s advocate’s argument,
weather can still be plausibly considered personal data in Europe.
5. Is there a problem?
Should European data protection law faithfully follow the WP29’s broad
interpretation of personal data, and should the Court in its future case law
adopt a broad view on how information relates to people to warrant the appli-
cation of data protection law? I will offer a nuanced answer here: from the per-
spective of the present and near future of data protection, I welcome the broad
interpretation of the concept; yet, from the perspective of a more long-term
future, while I still support the broad scope of the legal protection that a
broad notion of personal data brings, I caution about the consequences of
imposing the same high intensity of obligations in all data processing situations.
5.1. Present and short-term future under the GDPR
At present, to the question whether a broad concept of personal data is pro-
blematic and needs to be limited my answer is a definite no. This is based on
193Ibid, [56].
194Ibid, [56] (‘a contrario, judgment of 17 July 2014, YS and Others, […] paragraphs 45 and 46’).
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two considerations. First, to restate the point made on a number of occasions
in this article, if data has a potential to impact people, it should trigger some
form of legal protection. The various elements of the concept ‘personal data’,
especially ‘relate to’, as interpreted in the WP136 and the case law provide a
roadmap towards mapping and assessing such intended and unintended
impacts. If it appears that more data under more circumstances is likely to
affect people, then more data should be considered personal and trigger appli-
cation of data protection law. In this vein, personal data should be interpreted
broadly.
Second, in the actual data protection practice today the range of situations
that are considered processing of personal data are much more limited than
the analysis in Part 3 might suggest, and we have not yet achieved the data
protection ‘system overload’, as the next section will describe it. One reason
for this is that the onlife world of total connectivity and data-driven agency
– while firmly on its way – has not arrived and established itself yet. The tech-
nology of datifying everything and using any information to lay connections
to people might be (nearly) there, but it has not yet been implemented in daily
practice to the degree that is making everything personal data as we speak,
albeit the share of the environment that is not converted into data and data
that is not personal steadily shrinks.
In addition, while according to the law in the books the concept of personal
data is broad and on the verge of becoming all-encompassing, in daily com-
pliance practice the data that I would argue should be considered personal in
the sense of the WP136 is often not recognised as such. This can happen
because of a lack of awareness on the part of the data controllers about the
exact meaning of personal data under data protection law. The first
example that comes to mind is the discussion that data protection lawyers
often have with data scientists regarding anonymisation. Data scientists
assume that a certain data analytics project they plan has a clean data protec-
tion bill of health since the data in question is encrypted or stripped of iden-
tifiers and hence does not contain personal data. The lawyers respond that if
the data scientists have or are reasonably likely to gain access to the encryp-
tion key or identifiers, the dataset in question is pseudonymous rather than
anonymous, ie it does contain personal data and is subject to data protection
law, leaving aside the fact that the encryption and pseudonymisation of the
dataset also constitutes processing of personal data and is subject to data pro-
tection law. It is easy to imagine a similar discussion regarding the status of
information as personal data when it is not ‘about people’ but relates to
them in purpose or effect. The new GDPR is equipped with stronger enforce-
ment tools than its predecessor, which hopefully will be instrumental in trans-
forming data protection law in the books into data protection practice.
Another reason is that while the explanation of the concept of personal
data in the WP136 is very comprehensive, it appears not comprehensive
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enough as data processing technology and practice progress. As a result,
there are a lot of future battles about the meaning of personal data that will
have to be fought and won, in courts, before data protection authorities
and in daily compliance practice, before even the data that already has
impact on people is recognised as personal and triggers legal protection.
Under these circumstances, narrowing down the concept of personal data is
not the game one should play. I will name only a few examples of these
future battles.
Given the ongoing merger of the material and online worlds, one of the
transformations leading to the onlife world,195 the Court of Justice may
soon face the question of the meaning of information and how it relates to
the information mediums, for instance, in cases involving human tissue
samples. Even the meaning of identifiability, so far considered clear, might
be broken open. While the WP136 provides elaborate guidelines on when a
person is considered reasonably likely to be identified, the explanation of
what ‘identified’ means is limited to ‘a natural person can be considered as
“identified” when, within a group of persons, he or she is “distinguished”
from all other members of the group’.196 Recital 26 names singling out as
an example of what would constitute identification, leaving the rest to
common sense. According to the GDPR definition of personal data, a
person is identified ‘in particular by reference to an identifier’197 [emphasis
added]. This means that the definition also might include identification
other than by reference to an identifier. At the same time, Leenes distinguishes
four types of identifiability, where only one type is on the basis of an identi-
fier.198 The need to explore the meaning of identifiability further is likely to
emerge in the context of facial detection technology used eg in ‘smart’
outdoor advertising boards which are now installed at railway stations, in
shopping malls or near supermarkets. Such technology enables recognition
of age, sex and facial expression of a person in front of the smart ad board,
it can deduce the mood he or she is in at that moment and it can display
in real time a suitable ad, tailored to a person or a group of people standing
near that board. Because, in contrast to the facial recognition technology,199
facial detection technology does not allow for the recognition of people
again, its creators consider that the data processed is anonymous. The Irish
Data Protection Commissioner in a recent press release took the view that
195Floridi (n 4) 2.
196WP 136 (n 15), 12.
197Article 4(1) GDPR.
198R Leenes, ‘Do They Know Me? Deconstructing Identifiability’ (2008) 4(1&2) University of Ottawa Law &
Technology Journal 135.
199Facial recognition is ‘automatic processing of digital images which contain the faces of individuals for
the purpose of identification, authentication/verification or categorization of those individuals’ (Article
29 Working Party Opinion 02/2012 on facial recognition in online and mobile services, 00727/12/EN,
adopted on 22 March 2012 (WP 192), 2).
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‘the technology […] does not involve the recording, analysis, matching, pro-
filing or storage of personally identifiable data’.200 The question this case
raises is whether displaying real time personalised ads to one or several
people without the aim of recognising those people in future constitutes sin-
gling out and identification in the sense of the GDPR.201
Under these circumstances falling back on what has been agreed on as the
meaning of personal data and narrowing it down would be counterproductive
in light of the aim of data protection law to ensure effective and complete pro-
tection of data subjects.202
5.2. Long-term future of the GDPR
Also from the perspective of the long-term future of data protection, the all-
encompassing interpretation of personal data and the resulting broad scope of
legal protection by themselves should not be the problem. Indeed, one could
argue that ‘if the weather is going to be used to target and categorise me, I need
protection against its potential to define me as dangerous or depressed’, even
if achieving this protection is difficult.203 I agree. The problem as I see it is that
in the circumstances where everything is personal data and everything triggers
data protection, a highly intensive and non-scalable regime of rights and obli-
gations created by the GDPR will not simply be difficult but impossible to
maintain in a meaningful way. Two factors are key to the ‘system overload’:
the broad personal scope of data protection law and the high intensity of
data protection compliance under the GDPR, the latter weighing heavier
than the former.
As to the personal scope, both the WP29 and the Court took a broad
approach to the concept of the data controller, thereby widening considerably
the range of actors subject to data protection obligations. The controller is the
natural or legal person which alone or jointly with others determines the pur-
poses and means of the processing of personal data,204 and is the primary
bearer of the data protection compliance burden. While a natural strategy
of avoiding data protection obligations was to argue that an entity at hand
does not have control over data processing and is a mere processor, the
WP29 explained that the legally relevant control stems not only from the
formal arrangements, such as law and contract, but also from the factual influ-
ence one has over data processing.205
200Data Protection Commissioner, Press Release on the use of Facial Detection Technology in Advertising,
published on 15 May 2017, available online www.dataprotection.ie/docs/EN/15-05-2017-Statement-
on-use-of-Facial-Detection-Technology-in-Advertising/i/1634.htm (accessed 17 February 2018).
201My answer would be yes, but I shall leave my argument for another time.
202Google Spain (n 116), [34].
203M Hildebrandt (in personal communication with the author).
204Article 2(d) DPD; Article 4(7) GDPR.
205Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of ‘controller’ and ‘processor’, adopted on 16
February 2010 (WP 169), 11.
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This assessment allows for the drawing of external conclusions, assigning the
role and responsibilities of controller to one or more parties. This might be par-
ticularly helpful in complicated environments, often making use of new infor-
mation technologies, where relevant actors are often inclined to see themselves
as ‘facilitators’ and not as responsible controllers.206
In another opinion, in the context of the social network providers (‘SNS’),
WP29 reasons that these are data controllers, since ‘they provide the means
for the processing of user data and provide all the “basic” services related to
user management (eg registration and deletion of accounts)’.207 An additional
factor determining the status of the SNS as a controller is that SNS providers
‘also determine the use that may be made of user data for advertising and mar-
keting purposes – including advertising provided by third parties’.208
In Google Spain, the Court adopted a similarly broad approach to control-
lership in relation to the search engine providers and personal data uploaded
on the third-party websites, arguing that a narrow interpretation would be
contrary to the DPD’s objective ‘to ensure… effective and complete protec-
tion of data subjects’,209 even in a situation where personal data is uploaded
on a third-party website and the controller has no knowledge of the
data.210 Notably, as decisive for establishing the factual influence over data
processing, the Court cited the fact that ‘processing [by the search engine]
… can be distinguished from and is additional to that carried out by publish-
ers of websites’.211 This and the WP29’s standards of the factual influence
amounting to controllership could be applied to any entity with a business
model consisting of providing somehow structured or new data processing
services with a predetermined user interface, which makes it ‘distinguished
from and additional to’ what their clients would do with the data otherwise.
These entities would then be fully bound by the full scale of data protection
obligations.212 Yet the broad personal scope of data protection law is also
not problematic by itself, which brings us to the next point, ie high intensity
of compliance.
The current data protection regime under the DPD already establishes
both ex post and ex ante controllers’ obligations. For instance, prior to proces-
sing the controller has to define the purpose and a suitable legal ground of
processing, which may include some impact assessment exercises, eg in asses-
sing compatibility of processing with the original purpose of data collection,
or if the controller considers using legitimate interest as a processing ground.
206WP 169, 11.
207Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking (WP 163), 5.
208Ibid, 5.
209Google Spain (n 116), [34].
210Ibid, [24], [34].
211Ibid, [35].
212Koops (n 35) criticises the GDPR for creating equal data protection regimes for different data processing
situations.
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The controller also has to assess legality, fairness and necessity of data proces-
sing before it commences, and monitor that the data is accurate and up-to-
date throughout the lifetime of personal data. The GDPR relies on the
culture of ongoing compliance even more heavily. To name just a few
examples, think inter alia of the principle of accountability, which requires
not only compliance with the GDPR but also the ability to demonstrate com-
pliance;213 data protection impact assessment implies ongoing assessment of
the risks of data processing, and taking risk-mitigating measures before,
during and after the data processing takes place.214 These are mostly not
just negative obligations to stay away from certain data processing (after all,
there is no problem with general obligations to refrain from killing or stealing
and these apply to everyone all the time); data protection law imposes positive
obligations to constantly take active action to comply.
The broad material and personal scope of European data protection law
combined with the high intensity of compliance under the GDPR, to exagger-
ate it ever so slightly, make data protection apply to nearly anyone processing
nearly any information at nearly any time, and the threat of serious sanctions
omnipresent. Going back to Lon Fuller, complying with and enforcing such a
law in a meaningful way is impossible, and something – enforcement or com-
pliance – will have to give. Facing the threat of effective and deterring sanc-
tions,215 the controllers, instead of engaging in a meaningful assessment of
fairness and necessity, will be pushed to create the formal appearance of com-
pliance by using ‘compliance surrogates’, such as compliance roadmaps,
‘accountability tools,’ trust marks and certification schemes. The latter will
likely be provided by private entities – law firms, consultancies and audit
firms – who are in the business of selling reassurances more than safeguarding
data protection interests,216 and whose products are bought to validate and
broadcast compliance to the shareholders, data subjects and the data protec-
tion authorities. Data protection, using the words of Julie Cohen, will become
‘Kabuki theater that distracts both users and regulators from what is really
going on’.217
Alternatively, or in addition, enforcement of the data protection rights and
obligations will likely become selective, determined by priority lists and short-
cuts that the data protection authorities would develop to cope with the
213Article 5(2) GDPR.
214Art. 35 GDPR et seq.
215Think of the administrative fines in Art 83(4) GDPR of ‘up to 10 000 000 EUR, or in the case of an under-
taking, up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is
higher’.
216Eg N Purtova, ‘Who Decides on the Future of Data Protection? Role of Law Firms in Shaping European
Data Protection Regime’ (2014) 28(2) International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 204.
217Julie E Cohen, ‘The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance Economy’
(forthcoming) Philosophy & Technology, available online at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2666570 (accessed
17 February 2018).
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workload, including the ‘compliance surrogates’. Selective enforcement and
the pretence of compliance will reinforce each other, ridiculing data protec-
tion law, and depriving its protection of meaning.
6. Conclusion: what to do about personal data?
This contribution, having examined the notion of personal data in EU data pro-
tection law, concludes that in the onlife world of data-driven intelligence which
is firmly on its way everything will soon fall within the definition of personal
data as interpreted by the WP29 and the Court of Justice. The rapid progress
of (re)identification technologies and failure of anonymisation certainly play
an important role in this argument. However, the main contribution of this
article was to argue that the other two elements of the definition, ie ‘infor-
mation’ and ‘relating to a natural person’, are key to this shift as well. The
legal definition of personal data is not based on any articulated understanding
of information but must be interpreted broadly; this allows for the definition to
embrace the theoretical perspectives which consider everything to be or contain
information. Further, when increasing amounts of information are gathered
from increasingly ‘smart’ environments that assess or affect us in real time, it
is safer to assume that any information is likely to relate to a person.
Given that the onlife world of hyperconnectivity and data-driven agency has
not yet arrived and firmly established itself, at present a broad definition of per-
sonal data does not cause problems. Indeed, it is to be welcomed in light of the
aim of data protection law to ensure effective and complete protection of data
subjects. Yet once the onlife world becomes a reality, the good intentions will
backfire. The system of legal protection based on such an all-encompassing
notion and high intensity of positive compliance obligations is not going to
be sustainable in the long run. So what other options do we have for that
future of data protection law and what should we do with the concept of per-
sonal data? Once the tipping point is reached and everything is personal data in
the sense of the GDPR and the WP136, I see three possible ways forward.
One option would be to adopt a narrower meaning of personal data.
However, this option has its own limitations. While the downside of having
a too broad definition is stretching the scope of data protection law too far,
the risk of opting for a (too) narrow definition is incomplete protection of
rights and interests that data protection law was intended to provide. As
the Court acknowledges, a broad concept of personal data and a very wide
material scope serve the protective objectives of data protection law.
Granted, what those objectives are is subject to debate,218 and the wording
218G Gonzalez Fuster and S Gutwirth, ‘Opening up Personal Data Protection: A Conceptual Controversy’
(2013) 29 Computer Law & Security Review, 531; N Purtova, ‘Default Entitlements in Personal Data in
the Proposed Regulation: Informational Self-Determination off the Table… and Back on Again?’
(2014) 30(1) Computer Law & Security Review 6.
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of the GDPR does not provide much clarification, referring to ‘the protec-
tion of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data’.219 At the same time, cutting
back on the range of situations to which data protection law should
apply cannot be done simply because a broader interpretation is unpracti-
cal. It requires careful thought, both as to what the protective objectives
are, and as to where the boundaries of ‘personal data’ should lie to
achieve those objectives. Narrowing down the interpretation of ‘relate to’
to, for example, a relationship by reason of content would make little
sense as it is not clear why the protection should be triggered by proces-
sing of information that is about a person, and not when the information
is processed with the purpose of affecting or assessing a person, while the
latter describes a significant part of those data processing situations which
raise concerns. Likewise, it is doubtful that a dataset should be subject to
the data protection regime when its owner has sufficient tools to identify
people in it, and why it should be exempted when the database owner and
the tools of identification are just a few transactions away from each other.
In the age of software as a service, one does not need to be a ‘digital giant’
with one’s own identification capacities, when one can easily ‘borrow’
those on a pay-per-use basis. Think of the powerful data analytics tools
such as IBM’s Watson220 becoming increasingly available to a growing
range of users.
Another option would be to preserve the broad interpretation of per-
sonal data but reduce the intensity of compliance obligations, for instance
by matching the intensity to risks. Koops considered an option of having
different sets of obligations for different kinds of personal data an improve-
ment on the compliance regime under the GDPR.221 Schwartz and Solove
similarly proposed treating information with varying degrees of identifiabil-
ity differently.222 The GDPR arguably implements this idea, inter alia, in
the qualified obligation to perform data protection impact assessment
under Article 35, and the Article 11 exemption from the data protection
obligations which require identification when such identification is not
necessary for the purpose of processing. However, this option raises the
same issue as the first one: how do we know where to draw the boundaries
between the compliance regimes of different intensity, and how do we
know a particular configuration will meet the protective objectives of the
data protection law?
I believe that there is a third option which too deserves careful consider-
ation, namely, to abandon the concept of personal data as a cornerstone of
219Eg Recital 10 GDPR.
220www.ibm.com/watson/.
221Koops (n 35).
222Schwartz and Solove (n 8) 1877.
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data protection altogether, and seek remedies for ‘information-induced
harms’ – understood broadly as any individual or public negative conse-
quences of information processing – without a sentimental attachment to
this familiar proxy. To preserve this formal distinction will always imply
that there is also data that is not personal, and while the former triggers
legal protection, the latter should not. This duality is at odds with the
world where any information has the potential to affect people. Therefore,
all automated information processing should trigger at least an obligation
to assess what impact it is likely to have. In this sense, to abandon the
formal use of the notion ‘personal data’ amounts to accepting that all
data is personal. Some might argue that it is already a matter of good prac-
tice to perform such impact assessment prior to data processing. In fact, as I
argued earlier in this paper, to meaningfully apply the definition of personal
data and establish whether or not a planned instance of data processing is
within the GDPR’s material scope, one effectively has to assess both likely
and factual intended and incidental impacts of data processing on people.
However, the fact of the matter remains that there is no such legal obli-
gation. The only way to change this is to shift the default setting to ‘all
data is personal’ and use this departing point to build a system of scalable
data protection rules.
Whichever option it is, it is essential for the success of future legal pro-
tection against ‘information-induced harms’ that it is grounded in a better
understanding of information and its relationship to people, in well-
understood and articulated problems that it intends to solve and in the
fully mapped mechanics of the information-induced harms it intends to
avert.
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